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CATEGORY RELATIONS,
OMNIRELEVANCE, AND
CHILDREN’S DISPUTES
Stephen Hester and Sally Hester
ABSTRACT
Purpose – This chapter explicates the categorical resources and practices
used in some disputes involving two children.
Methodology – The data on which the study is based consists of a
transcript of an audio recording of the naturally occurring talk-in-
interaction during a family meal. This data is analyzed using the approach
of membership categorization analysis (MCA).
Findings – We show that it is neither the category collection ‘‘children’’
nor the category collection ‘‘siblings’’ that is relevant for the organization
of these disputes but rather a number of asymmetrical standardized
relational pairs, such as ‘‘rule-enforcer’’ and ‘‘offender’’ or ‘‘offender’’ and
‘‘victim.’’ It is these pairs of categories that are demonstrably relevant for
the members, providing for and making intelligible their disputes. We then
consider the question of the demonstrably relevant ‘‘wider context’’ of the
disputes to which the disputants are actually oriented. This wider context
is an omnirelevant oppositional social relationship between the children.
We demonstrate that the disputes reﬂexively constitute the character
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of their oppositional relationship and show how these are instantiations
of an omnirelevant category collection, namely, ‘‘parties to an oppositional
relationship.’’
Value of paper – This paper AU :1contributes to the corpus of ethnometho-
dological studies on children’s culture in action and more particularly on
the categorical organization of children’s (and others’) disputes. It also
contributes to MCA more generally in respect to its focus on the issues of
omnirelevance and the ‘‘occasionality’’ of category collections.
Keywords: Ethnomethodology; membership categorization analysis;
children’s disputes; demonstrable relevance; social relationships;
omnirelevance
In this chapter, we use membership categorization analysis (MCA) to
explicate the categorical resources and categorization practices used by two
children in the production of their disputes. The data for the study consist of
some instances of such disputes which occurred during a family meal
involving a mother and a father and their two children, a boy of 13 and a girl
aged 8. MCA emphasizes that it is of crucial importance to comprehend the
categories and category collections that are demonstrably relevant for the
participants in the scenes of social life. The analyst is not entitled to merely
assume that some category collection such as ‘‘children’’ is relevant for
understanding ‘‘children’s disputes.’’ The relevance, for members, of such a
categorization would have to be demonstrated for the analyst’s account to be
an adequate one. We accordingly seek to discover and to demonstrate just
what categories are organizationally relevant for the participants in them.We
show that it is neither the category collection ‘‘children’’ nor the category
collection ‘‘siblings’’ that is relevant for the organization of these disputes
but rather several asymmetrical standardized relational pairs (SRPs) of cate-
gories such as ‘‘rule-enforcer’’ and ‘‘offender’’ or ‘‘offender’’ and ‘‘victim.’’ It
is these pairs of categories that are demonstrably relevant for the members,
providing for and making intelligible their disputes. We then consider the
question of the ‘‘wider context’’ of the disputes. At issue is whether such
wider contexts are actually oriented to and relevant for the disputants. Our
vehicle for addressing this issue is Sacks’ concept of omnirelevance. We show
that the relevant context for the disputants is their omnirelevant oppositional
social relationship. The disputes reﬂexively constitute, and comprise recog-
nizable instantiations of an omnirelevant category collection, namely,
‘‘parties to an oppositional relationship.’’
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STEPHEN HESTER AND SALLY HESTER2
CHILDREN’S CULTURE AND CHILDREN’S
DISPUTES
An ethnomethodological approach to children’s culture emphasizes
‘‘culture-in-action’’ (Hester & Eglin, 1997; Sacks, 1992a, 1992b; Speier,
1971, 1973, 1976). A particular avenue of inquiry has been concerned with
the cultural resources used in children’s disputes, and a major focus of
attention in this ﬁeld has been on the sequential organization of these
disputes (Church, 2009; Maynard, 1985). It has been shown, for example,
that the sequence of a dispute begins with a ‘‘disputable’’ or ‘‘arguable’’
(Maynard, 1985). The second part of the sequence involves a second party
producing a turn which disputes or argues with the disputable turn. The
disputability of the ﬁrst turn is only realized in the second turn and is a
product of analysis by its recipient or other participant in the interactional
scene. For example, analyzing that one has been insulted, or analyzing that
one has been inappropriately directed, or analyzing that someone’s account
is false is made available in the response to the turn containing the
disputable. According to Maynard (1986) the dispute ‘‘takes hold’’ in the
third turn when the original disputable ‘‘is defended by the ﬁrst speaker’’
(Church, 2009, p. 12).
Another complementary strand of work has used MCA to investigate
children’s disputes (Bateman, 2012; Butler, 2008; Butler & Weatherall, 2006;
Danby & Baker, 1998, 2000; Hester & Hester, 2010) and it is the approach
used in this chapter. The potential payoff is that will offer insight into
children’s relationships, how these may be involved in their disputes, their
own analyses of what is disputable and how these disputes are then
organized. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed
discussion of MCA.1 However, it is important for this chapter to make some
remarks about what MCA is not. In particular, MCA is not the mere
observation and re-description of members’ talk and interaction in terms of
a collection of technical concepts such as membership category, membership
categorization device, and so on. MCA is something that the members of
society engage in themselves when they make sense of the social world
around them and produce their own actions as analyzable and recognizable
by other members. As an analyst’s enterprise, then, MCA is not simply
description but the analysis of members’ analyses.
MCA’s emphasis on members’ categorization practices follows of course
from its ethnomethodological roots. Thus, it is now well known that
where sociology prefers to treat social order as a theoretical problem,
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ethnomethodology and conversation analysis have established programs of
inquiry which respecify that orderliness as members’ phenomena of practical
action and practical reasoning (Button, 1991; Garﬁnkel, 1967, 1991, 2002;
Hester, 2009). One expression of this respeciﬁcation consists in how MCA
has transformed categorizations of persons from taken for granted resources
for sociological explanation into topics of inquiry in their own right (Sacks,
1992a, 1992b; Zimmerman & Pollner, 1971). As Sacks (1992a, p. 41) pointed
out: ‘‘all the sociology we read is unanalytic, in the sense that they simply
put some category in.’’ This is done, for example, in selecting race, class, or
gender categories and then comparing distributions of some ‘‘problematic’’
type of behavior between these categories. In ‘‘just putting the category in’’
sociologists presume these categories are appropriate ones for under-
standing the behavior in question. However, not only is it the case that these
categories may not have any bearing on the behavior in question as far as
the participants themselves are concerned, it is also the case that the
procedures used in selecting and applying such categories for persons have
not been subjected to analysis. In contrast, MCA has investigated how
members of society (including professional sociologists) select and make use
of categories in social interaction.
It was in this connection that Sacks (1966) also drew a distinction between
‘‘possibly correct’’ versus ‘‘interactonally relevant’’ categories (Coulter,
1991). While persons may be ‘‘correctly’’ described as male, female, old,
young, black, white, American, British, or Irish, not all of these will be
relevant for some piece of social action. The research policy and task is to
investigate which categories are selected and used in actual instances of talk-
in-interaction. Schegloff (1991) later reiterated and elaborated this distinc-
tion in his discussion of the ‘‘demonstrable relevance’’’ and ‘‘procedural
consequentiality’’ of categorizations of persons.
These considerations pertaining to the relevance of categories for
members have some speciﬁc consequences for the analysis of ‘‘children’s’’
disputes. A categorical orientation to the analysis of children’s disputes
raises the question of the relevance of the category ‘‘child’’ for under-
standing the disputes to be analyzed. Indeed, Maynard (1986) has drawn
attention to the possibility that the sequential structures deployed in the
accomplishment of children’s disputes may not be unique to children at all.
In addressing the sequential organizational practices that are the witnessable
endogenous properties of the local order of disputes, it is important to
recognize that in characterizing them as ‘‘children’s disputes’’ such a char-
acterization should in no way be taken as a claim that children’s disputes are
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STEPHEN HESTER AND SALLY HESTER4
organizationally different from adults’ disputes. The sequential resources
used by parties to accomplish dispute may well be generic even if the actual
topics of the disputes may differ. In a similar vein, as has also been argued
by Butler (2008, p. 14), the category collection ‘‘children’’ may not be the
relevant organizational device for the participants in such disputes at all.
If it is, on the other hand, it is incumbent on the analyst to demonstrate that
this is so, rather than simply presuming it a priori.
The key point is that the particular categories that the parties are oriented
to, and that are relevant for them in the organization of the disputes, are
matters for empirical research and are to be discovered in the research
materials rather than being presumed at the outset. Therefore, the research
questions are: What categories and collections of categories do the parties
involved actually use in accomplishing their disputes? Are they disputing as
‘‘children,’’ ‘‘classmates,’’ ‘‘neighbors,’’ ‘‘gang members,’’ ‘‘game players,’’
‘‘siblings,’’ or as incumbents of some other membership categories? In our
data, and we assume in the case of disputes generally, it is not categories in
isolation but pairs of categories. Minimally, the relevant categories are
disputant/disputant, but there seems to be more going on in these disputes
than the occupancy of opposing dispute positions. Dispute turns can
accomplish actions more than simply disputing. A dispute turn may, for
example, be put to the service of putting somebody down, challenging their
authority, getting someone into trouble, and a variety of other actions. Such
actions, furthermore, are category-implicative; they consist of activities that
are bound to particular membership categories for the occasion of their
production, and they imply relationally paired categories. These ‘‘relational
pairs’’ are ‘‘standardized’’ in so far as the one makes the other program-
matically relevant and the parties are mutually aware of the predicates
attached to each member of the pair relative to the other (Sacks, 1966, p. 37).
A distinction can also be drawn between those SRPs which are symme-
trical and those which are asymmetrical. The membership categories of
symmetrical SRPs have similar predicates; asymmetrical SRPs are con-
stituted from different activities, rights, responsibilities, entitlements, and
other predicates. For example, in the case of the SRP ‘‘master/slave,’’ the
‘‘master’’ has different rights from those of the ‘‘slave’’ and in the case of the
SRP ‘‘teacher/student,’’ the teacher has different predicates from those of
the student.2
Our proposal with respect to our data is that neither the category collection
‘‘children’’ nor those of the SRP ‘‘brother’’ and ‘‘sister’’ would be effective in
making recognizable what the participants were doing. Speciﬁcally, the
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activities in question are not, prima facie, bound to the categories ‘‘children’’
or to ‘‘brother’’ and ‘‘sister.’’ These activities consist of degradations and
attempted degradations, insults and name callings, rebukes, mockery, and
various resistances, defences, and other counters. These activities are not
bound to the category collection ‘‘children,’’ nor to the category collection
‘‘brother’’ and ‘‘sister.’’ The question then is: if these activities are neither
bound to ‘‘children’’ nor to ‘‘siblings’’ then what categories and category
collections are they bound to? To answer this question we will turn to our
materials.
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the data upon which our
study is based consists of some instances of audio-taped and transcribed
(according to Jefferson, 1978) talk-in-interaction which occurred during the
course of a family meal involving a mother (Jen) and a father (Harry) and
their two children, a boy of 13 (Russell) and a girl aged 8 (Maggie).3 For
reasons which should become clear as the analysis proceed, we have selected
not only the disputes which occurred between the two ‘‘children’’ but also
some of the talk-in-interaction which preceded it and followed it. In the
analyses that follow, we show that a collection of asymmetrical SRPs, such
as ‘‘rule-enforcer’’ and ‘‘rule-breaker,’’ ‘‘rebuker’’ and ‘‘resister,’’ and
‘‘bully’’ and ‘‘victim,’’ are used to organize and structure the disputes. We
will illustrate this with three data excerpts.
In Excerpt 1 Russell and Maggie have just been informed via their
mother’s announcement that dinner is now ready and that they should go to
the bathroom and wash their hands. On their way from the bathroom to the
kitchen a ‘‘ﬁght’’ breaks out and as they enter the kitchen the following
occurs:
Excerpt 1.
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In sequential terms, after Maggie’s initial complaint (line 1) to her
mother, and its repetition (line 3), that Russell ‘‘strangled’’ her, a dispute
between Russell and Maggie develops (from line 6) about whether his
‘‘strangling’’ her ‘‘hurt’’ or not. The dispute sequence begins with Maggie’s
disputable complaint that Russell’s strangling her ‘‘hurt.’’ He disputes this
by saying (line 8) that ‘‘of course it didn’t hur’’’, although he does not deny
having attempted to strangle her. She then disputes this with her reassertion
(line 9) that it did ‘‘hu:r’.’’ In terms of the categorical resources used to
produce the dispute, the organizing membership categories, we suggest, are
neither ‘‘child–child’’ nor ‘‘brother’’ and ‘‘sister.’’ This is not to say that the
participants in the dispute are neither children nor siblings. Rather, it is to
say that these categories by themselves are not demonstrably relevant for
them because they do not render intelligible the nature of what these
‘‘children’’ or ‘‘siblings’’ are doing. The organizing category collection for
the recognizability of the dispute at hand involves the asymmetrical SRP,
‘‘offender’’ and ‘‘victim.’’ In saying that ‘‘you strangled me, it hurt,’’ Maggie
categorizes him as an offender/aggressor against her and herself as a victim.
It is his behavior as an aggressor that she ﬁnds complainable, not the fact
that he is another child and a brother. He disputes her categorization,
denying that he offended in the way that she claims and also that she is a
victim because his actions did not in fact hurt.
In rejecting the category pair, ‘‘victim’’ and ‘‘offender’’ Russell attempts
to locate the strangulation within a rather different pair of categories,
possibly ‘‘teaser’’ and ‘‘teased.’’ He does not deny that he ‘‘strangled’’ her –
he says that ‘‘she wouldn’t die’’ – but this ‘‘admission’’ humorously
misidentiﬁes (cf. Sacks, 1992a, p. 419) the character of his action in that the
mother responds to it with ‘‘oh Russell please’’ rather than with a response
more resonant with an admission to a serious crime. His self-misidentiﬁca-
tion as an ‘‘attempted-strangler’’ seems to be treating the episode as a
joke or play-ﬁght to which Maggie has over-reacted. Furthermore, this
over-reaction has been expressed with an incorrect (as far as Russell is
concerned) and therefore contestable identiﬁcation of the two categories
involved.
It is important to note that both her selected categories – victim and
offender – and his – teaser and teased – are asymmetrical. In terms of the
predicates of these categories, both put Russell in an ‘‘elevated’’ and
‘‘dominant’’ position relative to that of his sister. As an offender, in
relation to his sister as a victim, he has physically ‘‘overpowered,’’
dominated, and inﬂicted injury upon his sister. As a teaser, she is again a
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victim, albeit of a joke rather than a physical assault. The second excerpt is
as follows:
Excerpt 2.
Here the dispute sequence begins with an action by Maggie in response to
which Russell (line 2) makes an imputation of deviance.4 This deviance
involves Maggie reaching across the table to get a drink. This is an instance
of a ‘‘dinner-time rule’’ being invoked by Russell, namely, that diners do not
reach across the table to obtain items but rather they should make requests
for others to pass them the item which they want.5 The imputation of
deviance is disputed by Maggie who declares (line 4) that she did ask. Jen,
the mother, also disputes (lines 5–6) Russell’s complaint/accusation,
corroborating Maggie’s version of events. In the third turn of the dispute,
Russell addresses his mother and corrects her (line 7) with the retort that
Maggie did not ask for a drink but asked for a side plate.
As with Excerpt 1, the natural history of this dispute can be seen to be
organized in terms of an asymmetrical standardized relational pair of cate-
gories, rule-enforcer and deviant. Russell takes a position as the incumbent
of the membership category ‘‘rule-enforcer,’’ imputing the relational
category ‘‘rule-breaker’’ or ‘‘deviant’’ to Maggie on the grounds that she
did not ‘‘ask’’ for a drink to be passed to her. However, rather than accept-
ing this category imputation, Maggie counters that she did not break a rule
because she ‘‘did’’ ask him. She is not therefore an ‘‘offender’’ because she in
fact produced an action that exhibited rule-compliance, not deviance. So,
contrary to Russell’s category imputation, she is actually a ‘‘rule-follower’’
not a deviant. Her category-resistance and counter-self-categorization as
‘‘rule-follower’’ (via the category-bound activity ‘‘asking’’) is then countered
(after the mother’s corroboration of Maggie’s resistance) by Russell. He
does not dispute that she ‘‘asked’’ for something but that she asked for a
side plate, not a drink. She may have been a rule-follower in asking for a
side plate but in so far as she did not ask for a drink her incumbency of the
category ‘‘deviant’’ remains therefore in place, with Russell sustaining his
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STEPHEN HESTER AND SALLY HESTER8
incumbency of the asymmetrical relational category, ‘‘rule-enforcer.’’ This is
not disputed by his mother or by his sister.
Excerpt 3.
This excerpt contains an extended dispute. The initial disputable is
Maggie’s standing up from the table where she has been sitting since the
beginning of the meal. Russell tells her to ‘‘sit down’’ (line 2), which involves
the invocation of another mealtime rule. The dispute then ‘‘takes hold’’ in
line 3 when Maggie disputes both his right to invoke the rule and the
veracity of his claim that she has broken a rule in the ﬁrst place. She does so
by offering an account for the fact that she is standing up. For Russell, her
account is disputable, and so he extends the dispute by challenging it (lines 5
and 6). Maggie, in turn, re-asserts, elaborates, and dramatizes (lines 7 and 9)
her account which is then met by Russell’s recycling of the original directive
that she ‘‘sit down’’ (line 11). At line 12, Maggie makes an attempt to ‘‘turn
the tables’’ on Russell through her invocation of another mealtime rule,
namely, ‘‘not talking with one’s mouth full.’’ Unfortunately, she states
this incorrectly and Russell is presented with an opportunity to ridicule her
(lines 14 and 18).
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Several asymmetrical SRPs can be seen in use in this extended dispute.
First, at the beginning of the excerpt (line 2), it can be seen that Russell
assumes incumbency of the category ‘‘rule-enforcer,’’ as he did in Excerpt 2,
this time directing Maggie to sit down. His directive involves, then, another
imputation of deviance to Maggie: she has broken another mealtime rule by
standing up instead of remaining seated. She is therefore not only an
offender against whom the rule can be invoked by the enforcer, she is also in
the position of someone who can be told, instructed, and directed as to what
they must do. As rule-enforcer, Russell assumes the ‘‘right’’ to censure
Maggie who, as an imputed incumbent of the category ‘‘rule-breaker’’ or
‘‘deviant,’’ is required to ‘‘comply.’’ In resisting the directive, Maggie also
resists the imputed incumbency of the categories of ‘‘deviant’’ and ‘‘person-
who-can-be-instructed-directed-and-be-told-to-comply’’ that comes with it.
Her resistance involves, ﬁrst, saying that she ‘‘knows’’ what the rule is and
therefore is not someone to be instructed and directed about it. She
therefore resists not only her categorization as one who can be properly
directed but also his presumed self-categorization as rule-enforcer and
director. Second, her resistance involves offering an account for her
ostensible infraction, namely, that she ‘‘slipped.’’ Her ‘‘excuse’’ means that
she is a ‘‘victim’’ of circumstances beyond her control; she is not the deviant
that Russell claims that she is.
We have said that her account becomes another disputable for Russell.
He endeavors to expose not only its fallaciousness but also the claimed
incumbency of the category ‘‘victim’’ that it implies. For Russell, slipping
would not have produced the end-product of standing up, as Maggie claims.
Persons do not accidentally stand up. Standing up is the outcome of
deliberate and intentional action. She is therefore not a victim but an
offender who can be properly directed. She may even be a liar. Again,
Maggie resists Russell’s various categorizations of her, offering an elabor-
ated account and an enactment of her ‘‘slipping’’; she ‘‘went backwards like
that.’’ Unfortunately, this account and the accompanying enactment again
produces a standing up, thus making relevant a recycling of the original
directive from Russell that she should ‘‘sit down,’’ which he duly produces.
He therefore retains incumbency of the categories ‘‘rule-enforcer’’ and
‘‘director’’ and she correspondingly remains in the asymmetrically paired
category position of one who is an ‘‘offender’’ and who may therefore be
directed and made to comply.
Maggie’s response to the recycled directive is a recycling of her original
resistance, namely, she ‘‘knows’’ the rule about standing up. She therefore
disputes again his presumed incumbency of the category rule-enforcer and
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STEPHEN HESTER AND SALLY HESTER10
the activity of directing that is here predicated of it. She then attempts to
‘‘turn the category tables,’’ so to speak, by issuing a directive of her own. In
doing so, she can be understood as attempting to switch places in the
asymmetrical category arrangements that have so far constituted the
produced structure of this episode of talk-in-interaction. Thus, she invokes
the mealtime rule ‘‘no talking with your mouth full,’’ issuing a directive to
Russell, ‘‘don’t talk with your mouth open.’’ In invoking this rule and in
issuing this directive she is attempting to locate herself within the category
‘‘rule-enforcer’’ with its attendant entitlement to engage in the category-
bound activity, ‘‘issuing directives’’ and to allocate to Russell the
asymmetrically paired categories ‘‘offender’’ and ‘‘one-who-can-be-direc-
ted-and-told-to-comply.’’ Unfortunately for her, this attempt to switch
category positions with Russell fails because she states the rule incorrectly.
It can be assumed that she meant to say, ‘‘don’t talk with your mouth full’’
which is a rule, like the sitting down rule, that has been invoked several
times previously in the meal by the mother. Instead, in saying, ‘‘Don’t talk
with your mouth open,’’ she presents Russell with an opportunity to make
fun of his sister, an opportunity that he loses no time in grasping. In
countering her directive with ‘‘how am I meant to talk then’’ he regains the
categorical advantage; she is now ‘‘reduced’’ from a rule-enforcer to an
incompetent speaker. Despite her attempt to correct herself by saying ‘‘you
have got a mouthful,’’ he nevertheless enacts compliance with Maggie’s
inept directive, showing what it would be like to talk with his mouth closed,
the incomprehensible, ‘‘ner ner ner ner ner ner.’’
We conclude this section by noting that a variety of asymmetrical
standardized category relational pairs are key organizational features of the
disputes exhibited in the excerpts we have analyzed. Thus, Russell attempts
in his various oppositional turns to ‘‘degrade’’ his sister in some way. He
tries to enforce a rule, call her deviant, hurt her, ridicule her, tease her, etc.,
and in so doing variously constitutes himself as a rule-enforcer, a director, a
strangler, a teaser, and so forth. In these actions, he allocates Maggie to
some category lower than his in the local categorical order. She is
someone who can be told what to do, who can be made to look stupid,
and who can be physically overpowered. Yet Maggie, even though she is
put on the defensive, resists; she does not accept his attempted cate-
gorical asymmetries. She resists the degradation and sometimes attempts
herself to reverse the attempted alignment of categories. Sometimes she
enlists the support of her mother (to even things up), and along with her
resisting, thereby constitutes herself as an incumbent of an oppositional
category.
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In the next section, we will consider how the asymmetrical category
relations and the degradations through which they are realized are omni-
relevant for thesemembers and remain ‘‘on the table,’’ so to speak, throughout
the meal.
CHILDREN’S DISPUTES AND OMNIRELEVANT
CATEGORY RELATIONS
So far, we have analyzed some disputes, paying particular attention to the
asymmetrical category relational pairs used in their organization. We have
sought to demonstrate that these category relations are those which are
relevant to the parties involved in the disputes. Thus, while the parties may
be ‘‘correctly’’ categorizable as children, and related to each other as brother
and sister, these membership categories are not by themselves the relevant
ones for the organization of these disputes. The relevant categories comprise
a collection of assymetrical standardized relational pairs: rule-enforcer/
deviant, director/directee, offender/victim, teaser/teased, and so on. These
do not negate their incumbency of the category collections ‘‘children’’ and
‘‘siblings’’ but such incumbency does not provide the categorical context for
the conduct of their disputes. In the second part of the paper we wish to
consider the connection between the asymmetrical category relational pairs
which are demonstrably relevant for, and which are used in organizing the
disputes, and a wider context of oppositional social relations between the
participants.6 We seek to show that the disputes emerge out of and reﬂexively
constitute an omnirelevant oppositional category relational pair, ‘‘parties to
an oppositional relationship.’’
Our starting point would seem to be fairly uncontroversial: children’s
disputes do not exist in isolation. They develop out of and contribute to
larger contexts of children’s lives. However, while this observation may
seem, on the face of it, to be uncontroversial and innocuous, the analytical
task of establishing a connection between the local ordering of disputes and
some wider context of children’s lives is, on reﬂection, less than straight-
forward. This is because any attribution of a contextual orientation to
the participants also has to comply with the methodological constraints of
demonstrable relevance outlined earlier in connection with membership
categories. As Schegloff (1992, pp. 196–197) writes:
If one is concerned with understanding what something in interaction was for its
participants, then we must establish what sense of context was relevant to those
participants, and at the moment at which what we are trying to understand what
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occurred. And we must seek to ground that claim in the conduct of the participants; they
show (to one another in the ﬁrst place, but to us as a by-product) what they take their
relevant context and identities to be.
Just as it is, then, for membership categories, so it is also that any
attribution and analytical use of social context must subscribe, at least in
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, to the principle of demon-
strable relevance: it has to be shown in the particulars of persons’ talk-in-
interaction that some context is relevant for them on the occasion of their
production of those particulars. There are two aspects of demonstrable
relevance here. The ﬁrst concerns how the parties to some scene or setting
demonstrate for one another that a particular sense of social context is
relevant for them, while the second refers to the methodological problem
for the analyst of how to demonstrate that a particular sense of context is
relevant for those participants. The authority for any claim for the latter
clearly rests upon the transparency and availability of the former. Thus, it is
one thing to assert that analysts should only deal with context as a members’
phenomenon and not as a theoretically driven imposition, but it is altogether
a different matter to produce analyses which satisfy such a constraint and
which can adequately display members’ orientations to social context as
constituents of their talk-in-interaction or other activities.
There are various kinds of context to which members may be oriented.
For any particular utterance or activity, the relevant context may be the
preceding turn or conﬁguration of turns at talk, it may be the local scene or
setting, such as a lesson in a classroom or an examination in a doctor’s
surgery, it may mean something situationally more diffuse, such as ‘‘our
family’’ or ‘‘this relationship,’’ or it may be the sort of object more traditio-
nally associated with sociologies of a more structural inclination, such as the
global oil economy, the American housing market, or the twenty-ﬁrst
century capitalism, to name just a few possibilities. Likewise, the analyst can
have no assurance that these various levels operate independently of one
another. Talk-in-interaction may be oriented to several contexts simulta-
neously, occurring not only ‘‘at this late hour’’ but also ‘‘in this family’’ and
‘‘within this relationship,’’ such that a multiplicity of contexts may be
demonstrably relevant for the participants. Nevertheless, whatever level of
context one is referring to, the point is that its availability as something
that the parties are oriented to can only be witnessed in what the parties
do and say.
With respect to the notion of demonstrable relevance in relation to social
contexts, Sacks’ writing on the subject of ‘‘omnirelevance’’ is especially
instructive. In the 1964–1965 lectures (1992a, p. 515), for example, the
discussion is developed from the question as to whether the analyst has any
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right to formulate a particular occasion, setting, or context when the
participants in it do not so formulate it. He asks (Sacks, 1992a, p. 515):
‘‘have we any special rights to assign name formulations to the actions,
upon, say, occasions when they are not assigned by the participants?’’ This
question can be heard, on the one hand, to allude to the problem of
demonstrable relevance, and on the other hand, to raise the issue of the use
of ‘‘formulations’’ in talk-in-interaction. The two issues are linked. Since
‘‘members can’t do pure formulating’’ (Sacks, 1992a, p. 521), because
formulations of some setting are not done for their own sake but are always
done as some action for a particular purpose, is the analyst only justiﬁed in
‘‘assigning name formulations’’ to occasions and settings when they are so
formulated as a course of action other than mere formulating? The problem
is that it is frequently the case that persons do not so formulate their
settings, either merely or for other purposes. Rather, it would seem that they
take them for granted, and so how then can it be shown that they are
oriented to a setting?
One direction might be to assume that if the analyst can see ‘‘it’’ (a
particular sense of an utterance, a category incumbency, a setting) in some
way, using their own cultural commonsense knowledge, then it can be
assumed that the participants themselves see it that way too. However, this
hardly amounts to a demonstration that some members actually display in
their talk-in-interaction their orientation to a setting. Another direction,
pursued by Sacks, is concerned with the question of whether members can
be said to be oriented to a setting or context even though they do not make
use of explicit formulations of its character. Sacks addresses this question in
his discussion of the concept of the ‘‘omnirelevance’’ (1992a, p. 594) of a
membership categorization device. As Sacks points out, the omnirelevance
of a membership categorization device means two things. The ﬁrst concerns
its ‘‘effectiveness’’ – that is, that the device allows the activities within a
setting to be ‘‘seeable,’’ intelligible, recognizable, that is, accountable
(Garﬁnkel, 1967) as comprising or constitutive of a particular type of setting.
Seeing what the setting or the occasion is involves seeing the participants as
incumbents of particular membership categories which are constitutive of the
setting. However, the effectiveness of a category collection in ‘‘seeing’’ some
activity as an activity of a speciﬁc sort does not, of course, mean that the
category collection is omnirelevant for a particular occasion or setting. It
only means that it is effective for the accountability of the speciﬁc instance
of the activity in question. The omnirelevance of the category collection
and hence the setting accomplished via the activities predicated of its
membership categories lies then not just in their occasional use in making
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sense of instances of talk-in-interaction but in the ‘‘anytime invocability’’
of those categories, that is, the device or collection may be invoked at any
time. In other words, the accountable production of speciﬁc sorts of talk-in-
interaction is provided for by the omnirelevance of particular membership
categories and the collections of which they are a part. Omnirelevance means
then that for a given setting or occasion there are activities or actions that
are ‘‘invocable,’’ that is, doable at any time, and these are provided for
and seeable as ‘‘effective’’ by virtue of their being tied to and expressive of
omnirelevant categories and the collections they are a part of and whose
enacted incumbency constitutes the setting for what it is.
There are, then, two tests for the omnirelevance of a social context. One is
that the parties analyze each other as having produced category-bound
activities bound to the categories comprising the collection parties to a
particular context. The second test is that of anytime invocability. However,
where Sacks addressed issues of omnirelevance in relation to social context
in the sense of ‘‘setting,’’ the type of context that we wish to analyze here is
the social relationship between the children in our data. Our argument is that
it is the nature of their social relationship as oppositional that comprises an
omnirelevant context of their interaction.
THE OMNIRELEVANCE OF ‘‘PARTIES TO AN
OPPOSITIONAL RELATIONSHIP’’: EFFECTIVENESS
With respect to the ‘‘effectiveness’’ of the relational pair, ‘‘parties to an
oppositional relationship,’’ the issue is whether it is possible to see that this
relational pair is the demonstrably relevant context of their talk-in-interaction
for the participants themselves. Our claim is that this relational pair is indeed
relevant in this way and that this can be seen in how they analyze and respond
to each other’s talk-in-interaction. That talk-in-interaction is analyzable by
the parties in terms of the device ‘‘parties to an oppositional relationship.’’ In
particular, it can be shown that in producing their responses both Russell and
Maggie display their analysis of the membership category in terms of which
the just completed turn was produced. Such turns are analyzed by the parties
as activities bound to the categories comprising the collection ‘‘parties to an
oppositional relationship.’’ These categories are effective in making account-
able, that is, recognizable, the character of the turn having been taken as
oppositional. So, in the response to an activity engaged in by a ﬁrst party, if the
second party responds in such away that this displays their analysis of the ﬁrst
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party’s action, and if that analysis is one that shows the second party analyzed
the ﬁrst party as the incumbent of an omnirelevant category, in this case
‘‘party to an oppositional relationship,’’ then we have a demonstration.
In nontechnical language, there is an underlying, ongoing struggle and
opposition between these ‘‘siblings’’ which ‘‘erupts’’ occasionally (formuch of
the rest of the time the children ignore each other). Opportunities for
expressing this underlying opposition are taken. More technically, when they
are taken they are analyzed by the recipient as ‘‘ﬁrst-turn-oppositionals’’ and
they exhibit their analysis by producing a ‘‘second-turn-oppositional’’
themselves. Furthermore, this opposition is often asymmetrical in that the
parties do not just oppose one another but do so in terms of an asymmetrical
oppositional pair of categories consisting of one who seeks to ‘‘get the upper
hand,’’ so to speak, and the other who resists (and occasionally attempts
to turn the category tables). As has been shown in the previous section,
oppositional talk that arises in this way sometimes develops into dispute. If
the excerpts analyzed above are considered again, it can be seen that the
sequences which eventually result in dispute commence with some talk or
action that is analyzed as asymmetrically oppositional by its recipient.
The analysis of an action as a ﬁrst-turn-oppositional and as having been
produced under the auspices of ‘‘parties to an oppositional relationship’’
can be seen in Excerpt 1 (above), for example, in the two complaints that
Maggie makes, ﬁrst to her mother that ‘‘he strangled me’’ (line 1) and
second to Russell himself (line 6) – ‘‘But you strangled me, it hurt.’’ In both
cases, Maggie’s response to Russell’s ‘‘strangulation’’ is not just that it was
an attempt to strangle her – she is not just reporting the strangulation – but
that it is a cause for complaint. He is not described as having ‘‘played’’ with
her, ‘‘touched’’ her, ‘‘messed about’’ with her, or even ‘‘teased’’ her. The
analysis of Russell’s actions that she produces in her complaint is not, say,
that they have just been role-playing a scene from some movie in which he is
the ‘‘murderer’’ and she is the ‘‘victim,’’ or that they have been playing a
computer game in which Russell’s character has just ‘‘strangled’’ hers. To
say that ‘‘he strangled me’’ against such a background would be to report
what occurred in the scene, it would not be a complaint about personal
injury. Maggie’s complaint, then, exhibits her analysis of the offensiveness
of the action complained about. That action was, in other words, produced
by an offender, not by a game- or role-player. In responding in the way that
she does she is claiming that he has produced an activity which is bound to
one of the categories of the asymmetrical oppositional relational pair, bully
and victim. In complaining that ‘‘he strangled me,’’ she is describing herself
as a victim which is paired with offender (bully in this case). She is analyzing
him as someone who is trying to be offensive toward her. The asymmetrical
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oppositional relational pair, offender and victim, is therefore ‘‘effective’’ for
the members in understanding the nature of this piece of interaction because
the actions produced are analyzed as category-bound to those categories.
Furthermore, in addressing her complaint to her mother, Maggie can be
heard to enlist her support against Rowan, and this suggests it is not a
‘‘ﬁght’’ among equals.
Similar conclusions can be reached with respect to Excerpt 2 in which
Maggie’s response to Russell’s initiating oppositional turn where he accused
her of ‘‘not asking’’ is evident. Russell’s turn is thus analyzed by her as an
oppositional one, putting her in the position of an offender and subject to
the enforcement activity of her accuser. ‘‘You could have asked’’ is not,
then, as far as Maggie is concerned a ‘‘reminding,’’ it is rebuking; it is not a
piece of neutral running commentary, it’s an instance of a rule-invocation.
The relevant and effective membership category for rebuke and rule-
invocation is not ‘‘reminder’’ or ‘‘commentator,’’ it is rule-enforcer.
Furthermore, such a category is paired with ‘‘offender.’’ Her analysis, then,
is that he sees her as having broken a rule and is now enforcing that rule,
while she is being allocated incumbency of the category ‘‘offender’’ or
‘‘deviant.’’ As we have seen, this analysis is made evident in her counter to
his enforcing turn: she did not break a rule; she behaved properly in terms of
the rule’s jurisdiction and did ‘‘ask’’ as required by it. Again, then, the
asymmetrical category relational pair ‘‘rule-enforcer/offender’’ is displayed
by her as effective in understanding his action toward her and her response.
Finally and similarly, in Excerpt 3, Maggie’s response, that is, what we
have referred to as her ‘‘resistance’’ indicates her analysis of his prior turn as
something to be resisted, something that is produced in opposition to her,
and which attempts to put her in her place. In saying she knows what the
rule is she resists his self-categorization as a rule-enforcer. The point is that
her resisting turn can be seen to display her analysis that his turn was
produced in terms of the auspices of the SRP ‘‘parties to an oppositional
relationship.’’
THE ANYTIME INVOCABILITY OF ‘‘PARTIES TO AN
OPPOSITIONAL RELATIONSHIP’’: THE
NONCONTINGENCY OF FIRST-TURN
OPPOSITIONALS
It has been shown that the two siblings make use of the asymmetrical
oppositional relational pair – ‘‘oppositional siblings’’ – in analyzing each
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others’ actions, that is in making them seeable, recognizable, intelligible,
etc., and that therefore this relational pair is ‘‘effective’’ as a method for
producing and understanding their actions. However, by itself, this
effectiveness of the category relational pair would not indicate that this
category relationship was omnirelevant. In this section we will show that
their oppositions meet the second ‘‘test’’ of the omnirelevance of a category
collection, namely, its ‘‘anytime invocability.’’
Excerpt 4.
On two occasions in the course of this excerpt, Russell uses the planned
surprise for ‘‘daddy,’’ namely, to see if he ‘‘notices’’ that a tree has been cut
down, to degrade his sister. First, at line 15, he calls her a ‘‘thicko::’’ and
then at lines 23–24 he describes her as someone who spoils ‘‘every little
‘guess what dad ner nery’.’’ The ﬁrst of these degradations is not
contingent on anything oppositional that Maggie has said to Russell in the
present context. It is a comment on Maggie’s conversation with her mother,
and speciﬁcally her failure to notice that her mother has chopped down
a tree-heather in the garden. As a ‘‘ﬁrst-turn oppositional’’ Russell’s
derogatory name calling clearly comes ‘‘out of the blue.’’ That it does so, of
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course begs the question of how it is understood by its recipients. Even
though ‘‘thicko::’’ is said in response to Maggie’s admission that she had not
seen the tree stump, it is not Maggie who produces an analysis of the
degradation, but Jen, the mother. She can be understood to be speaking on
behalf of Maggie at this point when she says ‘‘What have I done then Russ?’’
(line 16), a question which can be heard to say, ‘‘it’s all very well to degrade
her, but have you actually seen what I have done?’’ and by implication if
not, ‘‘are you ‘thicko’ too?.’’ In other words then, Jen takes up the
oppositional character of Russell’s name calling and counters it with a
challenge to him to demonstrate that he is not also an incumbent of the
category that he has attributed to Maggie.
As regards the second degradation, namely, Russell’s ﬁrst-turn
oppositional that Maggie ‘‘spoils every little thing’’ (line 23), this again
is not contingent upon anything oppositional that Maggie has just said to
Russell but is rather a recollection of how she has behaved on previous
occasions. From Russell’s point of view she ‘‘spoils’’ these guessing
games by giving the game away. It is, then, an opportunistic derogation,
occasioned not by anything that Maggie has actually done in opposition to
Russell; it is not contingent on her having occasioned the relevance of
their oppositional relationship. Rather, it is something that Russell non-
contingently chooses to invoke himself. Again, it can be seen that his ﬁrst-
turn oppositional is met by a response from Jen which displays her
analysis of its oppositionality. Thus, Jen contradicts Russell’s claim not
only that Maggie will spoil this game but also that she generally spoils
‘‘everything.’’ Clearly, Jen analyzes Russell’s derogation as having been
produced in terms of the relational pair of categories, ‘‘degrader’’ and
‘‘degraded.’’
Excerpt 5.
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This excerpt conﬁrms the ﬁndings which we have made in connection
with Excerpt 4. Just as Russell’s degradations in Excerpt 4 were produced
opportunistically and without reference to any prior oppositional, so here
Maggie’s derogatively calling Russell ‘‘sucker sucker’’ (line 32) is produced
not in response to something directed at her by Russell. Rather, it seems to
take advantage of an opportunity afforded when the mother comments that
the original author of the ‘‘Famous Five,’’ Enid Blyton ‘‘didn’t write it like
that’’ (line 30) in response to Russell’s reading of the description of the
Famous Five video game included in a catalogue. There is no evidence that
Jen intends this is as some kind of put-down or rebuke; it is not that Russell
got something wrong here, it is simply that the kind of language used by
Enid Blyton in the ‘‘adventure’’ stories about the Famous Five is a far cry
from the kind of language used in advertising and promoting video games.
Furthermore, the described content of the game indicates that the ‘‘Famous
Five’’ are engaged in activities very different from those found in Enid
Blyton’s books. However, while this is not a criticism of Russell, Maggie
nevertheless produces an oppositional turn by calling him a name: ‘‘sucker
sucker.’’ It can be heard to attempt to belittle him, to portray him as foolish,
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and thereby to invoke their opposition. As we have said, this name-calling is
not produced in response to a prior oppositional and is therefore ‘‘not
contingent’’ on his action toward her (even if it is contingent on something,
i.e., the ‘‘opportunity’’ at hand to make an oppositional remark). As
Russell’s response indicates, he certainly takes it that way, telling her to
‘‘shu’ up.’’
Excerpt 6.
A similar state of affairs is found in this excerpt. Here, again, the cate-
gorization ‘‘you’re weird’’ appears ‘‘to come out of nothing.’’ Minimally, it
comes out of Russell’s previous characterizations of the food with ‘‘yuch.’’
With Russell having made his assessments, then possibly those of Maggie
are now relevant, but not conditionally so. As it happens, her ‘‘yey’’ can
be understood as a response to the previous turn which is the actual serving
of the food that she now greets with enthusiasm. Rather than being an
oppositional to which his response is an oppositional of his own, her
nonoppositional assessment is met instead by a unilateral derogation of her
as ‘‘weird.’’ He does not like the food and his assessment is the ‘‘correct’’
one. The fact that Maggie likes the food is an indication that she is ‘‘weird.’’
Again, it would seem to be the case that the any time invocability of the
context of their oppositional relationships has to do with the ability of the
children to ﬁnd opportunities to turn some or even any previous utterance,
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into an oppositional. In this particular case it is his categorization of her as
weird which invokes that category relationship. He is the ‘‘normal’’ one,
whereas she is something lesser in the scheme of taste in relation to items of
food. The simple expression of the fact that she likes the food is turned into
an opportunity to put her down, to call her a name, to characterize her in a
negative way. In other words, it is another instance of the underlying
asymmetrically oppositional category relational pair being invoked non-
contingently but opportunistically at any time.
CONCLUSION
In the ﬁrst part of this chapter we analyzed some demonstrably relevant
membership categories which were used in organizing some disputes
between a brother and his sister. One implication of our analysis is that
no matter whom disputes are between, the persons involved are not just
disputants. They are engaged in disputes about something-or-other and it is
that something-or-other which provides the categories in terms of whose
incumbency the disputes are then produced. For example, a dispute might
be about the ownership of some object such that one of the organizing
categories is ‘‘thief’’ and the other ‘‘victim of theft.’’ Or it might be about the
disproportionate use of violence such that what was at issue was one party to
the dispute had ‘‘bullied’’ the other. In our data, by using asymmetrical
standardized relational pairs of categories such as ‘‘offender-victim,’’
‘‘teaser-teased,’’ and ‘‘rule-enforcer-deviant,’’ these ‘‘disputants’’ demon-
strate their competence in using categorical resources in their everyday social
relationships and, in particular, in analyzing each other as having produced
activities under the auspices of category collections and membership
categories. In short, they demonstrate their ability to use formal structures
of membership categorization as well as those of a sequential character.
In the second part of the analysis we indicated that these local expressions
of asymmetrically oppositional category relational pairs were ‘‘mapped’’
onto an omnirelevant oppositional social relationship between the disputants
(Watson & Weinburg, 1982). The omnirelevance of this relational pair of
categories was shown to consist in its effectiveness in analyzing (by the
participants) their talk-in-interaction as oppositional and in its invocability
at any time.
The relationship between the local expressions of opposition analyzed here
and an omnirelevant category collection ‘‘parties to an oppositional relation-
ship’’ also serves as a reminder of the ‘‘occasionality’’ of category collections
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(Hester & Eglin, 1997). Oppositional relationships can be constituted in a
variety of ways, and thereby oppositional categories can have various
activities predicated of them. The relationship between predicates, categories,
and the collection ‘‘parties to an oppositional relationship’’ is a contextual
rather than a decontextualized one. In the instances analyzed here, the
predicates of the categories in the omnirelevant collection ‘‘parties to an
oppositional relationship’’ considered in the second part of the chapter
are those produced in terms of the various SRPs analyzed in the ﬁrst.
NOTES
1. The major source here is Sacks (1992a, 1992b), though he did not distinguish
‘‘MCA’’ as a ﬁeld of inquiry in its own right. His studies in this area were part of his
wider interests in the analysis of conversation. For more recent works, see, for
example, Jayyusi (1984), Hester and Eglin (1997), Antaki and Widdicombe (1998),
Eglin and Hester (2003), Francis and Hester (2004), and Butler (2008).
2. The history of various ‘‘revolutionary’’ struggles can be seen as methods for
rectifying these categorical asymmetries. See also Sacks (1979).
3. The transcript was reviewed with one of the participants – the mother – who
also provided valuable information about some of the gestures and other nonverbal
actions which accompanied the talk, some of which turned out to be relevant for our
analysis. Pseudonyms are used for the participants.
4. It might seem that the status of Russell’s utterance as a ‘‘deviance-imputation’’ is
equivocal, and could perhaps be described alternatively or additionally as a
‘‘complaint.’’ However, the ‘‘test’’ for the resolution of any such equivocation lies
with what the recipient of the utterance makes of it rather than with the analyst. As the
excerpt shows, Maggie resists and denies having done what Russell accuses her of.
5. In saying that this is a ‘‘dinner-time rule’’ we are referring to the fact the mother
invokes this rule and several others, such as not talking with a mouthful of food, at
various points in the course of the meal.
6. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing to our attention the
work of Marjorie Goodwin on the constitution of oppositional relationships among
children. It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to explore the compatibilities
between Goodwin’s analysis of the production of oppositional relationships through
talk and our own analysis of the invocation of such omnirelevant relationships in
talk at this point.
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